CTBT

(1). to respond to global developments in nuclear disarmament and arms control as a responsible stakeholder in the non-proliferation regime

(2).  to negotiate India’s entry into the global nuclear order

(3).  to revive India’s long-forgotten tradition of campaigning for global nuclear disarmament.

By signing the CTBT, India could signal its intent to helprevive the global arms control and disarmament momentum, despite being a nuclear weapon state, thereby once again becoming part of the global disarmament movement which it once was

Resistance to CTBT does not need to continue anymore given that Indiadoes not intend to conduct any more tests(as declared in its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests). Hence accession to the CTBT can be used as a bargaining chip to mainstream itself into the nuclear order.

Once India signs the CTBT, some of the other hold-out states are likely to follow, such as Pakistan. Others like the U.S. (whose Senate is blocking the ratification though the U.S. government has signed it) and China would also come under pressure to accede to it. Thus India will be able to reverse the current non-proliferation pressure which makes sense not only from a strategic point of view but also from a normative perspective. Signing the CTBT, then, is in India’s enlightened self-interest.

most of the NPT regime’s key pillars — non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — are under immense stress, contributing to a systemic crisis.

Post the 2015 RevCon, both the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) — the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China — of the NPT and the disarmament enthusiasts among the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) seem to have run out of ideas on how to revive the global nuclear order.

(1). Negotiations on fissile material cut off treaty was blocked by Pakistan

(2). CTBT is losing steam due to lack of enthusiasm by USA

(3). The primary reason behind this system failure is the unkept promises by the NWS on the issue of global nuclear disarmament. The lack of any progress on Article VI of the NPT, which deals with nuclear disarmament, remains a stark reminder of the lopsided and flawed nature of the global nuclear order.

(4). The complete absence of any progress on the ‘grand bargain’ (that the NNWS would not make nuclear weapons and the NWS would eventually abolish the weapons they have) that lay at the heart of the NPT-led non-proliferation regime, has eroded the normative core of the global nuclear order.

Moreover, there is an unhealthy shift in the contemporary non-proliferation agenda. From the traditional concerns of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the focus today has shifted to counter-proliferation and nuclear security, primarily due to concerns about nuclear terrorism and the physical security of nuclear material. It is likely that future state-sponsored non-proliferation initiatives would eschew disarmament but deal with counter-proliferation, with an emphasis on the potential use of force.

Many of the promoters of the Humanitarian Initiativeview India’s exceptional treatment by the contemporary nuclear order as setting an unhealthy precedent and damaging to the normative framework of the nuclear order. Moreover, given the potential of the Humanitarian Initiative to drastically alter the traditional non-proliferation agenda, India’s desire to be accommodated in the global nuclear order is bound to hit major roadblocks.

(1).  India proposed an end to nuclear testing in 1954 after the U.S. nuclear testing in Bikini Atoll

(2).  India signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963

(3). Rajiv Gandhi’s impassioned plea to the U.N. General Assembly in 1988 for phased nuclear disarmament.

(4). India played a key role in the negotiations to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)and actively participated in the negotiations on the NPT, but decided not to sign when it became clear that it would become an unequal treaty.

India’s current engagement with the international nuclear order can be described as its second coming, after its anti-nuclear activism from the 1950s to the 1980s. From being vehemently opposed to nuclear weapons and any less-than perfect nuclear treaty, India today is open to negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and is no longer as opposed to signing the CTBT as it was in the mid 1990s.

India‘s opposition to signing the CTBT is counterintuitive in the sense that it was one of the first nations which appealed for a global ―immediate Standstill Agreement against nuclear weapons testing and had played an important role in building international consensus for the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. However, it decision against signing the CTBT is based on the argument that the treaty is of a discriminatory nature.

India‘s concerns arise from the fact that the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions but is silent on the issue of nuclear disarmament, which is essentially necessary to ensure a nuclear arms race. Also, the treaty is discriminatory in the sense that countries like USA, Russia and China had already conducted numerous tests before signing the treaty. Security concerns against adversial countries like China and Pakistan have also prompted India to maintain a strategic weapons programme.

Signing the CTBT would benefit India with a relative pointless moral victory. However,  India‘s stellar track-record on issues of non-proliferation and peaceful usage of nuclear technology is sufficient to ensure that it is considered a responsible nuclear armed country even while keeping the option of pursuing a weapons programme in the future to protect our sovereignty if the need arises.